OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Security Classification)

PRIORITY

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
761.00(W)/7-1560

This document must be Returned to IM/R Central Files

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

40
DESP. NO. JUL 19 1960

FROM : American Embassy, Moscow

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

DATE

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	IRC-10	INFO REP-1, RM/R-2, ICA-11, EUR-5, S/P-1, H/OP-1, AF-5, FARA-4
	REC'D 7/18	OTHER USIA-11, OSD-2, ARMY-35, NAVY-20, AIR-30, NSA-4

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 29 CIA-16, OCB-2

INDEX

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Touch Soviet Posture
2. Protests to U.S.
3. The Congo Republic
4. Cuba
5. The Democratic Convention
6. The World Peace Council

INTERNAL

7. Leadership
8. Party Central Committee Plenum
9. Investigation on Powers Completed
10. Possible Retirement of Marshal Timoshenko

DEPT OF STATE RECEIVED
1960 JUL 19 PM 5 05
IRC-ICD MESSAGE CENTER

761.00(W)/7-1560
HBS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY TL Ainsworth DATE 3/8/83
Item 2 Classified CONFIDENTIAL
~~PROJECT ASSESS~~. DATE CADR
TS AUTH. Bak REASONS 1.3(a)(3)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS 7(d)
DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE
RELEASE DENIED in part
FA or FOI EXEMPTIONS B-1

FJMeehan/VIToumanoff/
RIOwen/LBowden

REPORTER

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RECEIVED
AUG 1 1960

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL [redacted]

1. Tough Soviet Posture. Although Soviet spokesmen have not discarded the "peaceful coexistence" line, with its emphasis on negotiations, economic growth, and the rejection of nuclear war, Moscow unveiled a series of attacks to substantiate the picture of a declining but aggressive west. It almost appears as though the Soviets are beginning to run through their catalogue of Western weaknesses and Soviet strengths in order to prove to the world that there is, as they have claimed, a new correlation of forces which will enable the Bloc to expand without recourse to general war. The connecting thread in the RB-47 incident, the threat to support Castro with rockets, and the headlong Soviet plunge into the swirling waters of the Congo seemed to be a compulsion to prove Soviet military superiority over the US. Significantly the Soviet press continued to remain silent on the Chicom anti-American campaign and clamor to seize Taiwan.

2. Protests to U.S. The missing US RB-47 became the leading US-Soviet issue on July 11 when the USSR delivered a note revealing that the plane had been shot down by a Soviet fighter, allegedly for violation of Soviet air space on a spying mission, and that two survivors in Soviet hands would be prosecuted according to full severity of Soviet law. The answering US note has not been publicly mentioned by Moscow but an Izvestiya story ridiculed the utter lack of proof for the "White House statement" charging the plane was attacked outside the USSR.

Khrushchev's July 12 press conference statement appeared carefully worded and restrained and he avoided a display of temper. Press follow-up has been moderate, emphasizing foreign anti-US reaction rather than mounting the sort of wrath and indignation campaigns which followed the U-2 incident.

On July 13 the Foreign Ministry delivered a still unpublished memorandum protesting against [redacted] Ambassadors were separately given copies of the memorandum and orally warned against alleged similar activity on the part of [redacted]

3. The Congo Republic was the subject of a Soviet government memorandum of July 13 alleging that Western "imperialist" powers, with the US at their head, were about to initiate military intervention in Congo to suppress the new state, and expressing Soviet support -- without, however, any indications of specific action -- for the Congolese people's "struggle." Even after the [redacted]

adoption of the Tunisian resolution by the UN Security Council, with the US and USSR both voting in favor, Soviet propaganda continued to repeat the charges of the July 13 memorandum. Izvestiya (July 14) compared the Congo situation with Korea in 1950, alleging that the US hoped to intervene militarily under the cover of the UN flag.

4. Cuba. In his July 9 report on his trip to Austria, Khrushchev went out of his way to threaten by implication that the USSR would launch rockets against the US in case of US military attack on Cuba. While phrased hypothetically, the threat was successfully designed to make headlines, and represented a new departure by committing Soviet prestige in advance in an area where the USSR has little control of events. Khrushchev failed to repeat the threat in spite of ample opportunity in his press conference July 12, and carefully kept talk of Soviet rocket well separated in his remarks from assertions of Soviet support for the Cuban people should the US attack. Press follow-up has also avoided reassertion of the threat in original form.

The press has likewise given minimal play to Khrushchev's offer to buy blocked Cuban sugar, reporting it only through the statements of Cubans and avoiding mention of the amount involved.

5. The Democratic Convention results were reported in the Soviet press without immediate comment on Senator Kennedy's nomination. On the eve of the convention press coverage indicated a Soviet preference for Adlai Stevenson over the Senator, who has received generally unsympathetic Soviet press treatment. Soviet comment has stressed Kennedy's family and personal wealth, ascribed his successes in the primaries to demagoguery, among other things, and portrayed him as an all-things-to-all-men politician. Even Kennedy's criticism of the Administration's foreign policy is said to be a matter of form and not of substance, and his support for a high level of defense expenditures has earned him unfavorable notices.

As far as the Republicans are concerned, it is difficult to tell from press comment whom the Soviets dislike more, Vice President Nixon or Governor Rockefeller. Judging by the press, however, there is no doubt that they expect Nixon to win the nomination.

6. The World Peace Council bureau meeting in Stockholm (July 9-12) seemed intended as the point of departure for a major Soviet-inspired propaganda effort on disarmament. Bernal, the WPC chairman, called for a world-wide campaign of the dimensions of the 1950 Stockholm Appeal in support of a disarmament conference to be attended both by governments which are and are not UN members, that is, including Communist China,

among others. The peace movement was urged to exert pressure on governments to support the convening of such a conference. Peace supporters were also called on to send petitions to the UN in connection with forthcoming General Assembly consideration of disarmament.

INTERNAL

7. Leadership: With the single and possibly significant exception of K. Ye. VOROSHILOV, the entire Presidium, (including candidate members) made an excursion July 14 to Moscow's Northern river port to look at the latest river boat prototypes and to take a ride on the hydrofoil passenger boat Meteor. The party reportedly included also a large number of the other party and government personages gathered in Moscow for the expanded Central Committee plenum which had opened the previous day.

Little can be induced from the published press photos of the river port outing or from those of a small group of leadership photographed during a plenum intermission July 13. However, the presence of a broadly smiling M. A. SUSLOV practically rubbing elbows with N. S. KHRUSHCHEV in both instances may be intended to dispel speculation concerning differences between the two. Such speculation had received some encouragement early in the week from the fact that, contrary to reports in the remainder of the central press, neither Izvestiya on the evening of July 9 nor Pravda the had listed Suslov in the roster of Presidium members attending the July 9 final session of the RSFSR Teachers' Congress which Khrushchev addressed. (All papers reported Suslov's attendance that evening at the Kremlin reception for Indonesian First Minister DJUANDA.)

That Voroshilov is in town (and probably attending the plenum) was indicated by his being in the group welcoming the return of the Khrushchev party from Austria a week ago and also at the Teachers' Congress during Khrushchev's address there the next day.

8. Party Central Committee Plenum: Thus far, it appears that the Central Committee Plenum "on the development of industry, transport and the placing into production of the newest scientific and technical achievements," which began on July 13, closely follows the pattern of the last several expanded plenums as well as the program outlined in the May 12 announcement. As before, the very large number of invited participants so "expands" the gathering as to make it less a plenum than a mass meeting of the Soviet party-government elite attended by the Central Committee. As for the June 1959 and December 1959 plenums, it was opened by KHRUSHCHEV, who apparently prefers again to hear his colleagues out before delivering the major speech near the plenum's close.

The presence in Moscow of the full Presidium and, presumably, the full Central Committee permits restricted sessions of these bodies at which personnel-organizational questions could be raised. If such meetings take place and their actions are revealed publicly, we should have more information than at present to help in assessing rumored differences in approach by members or segments of the party leadership and the degree to which Khrushchev's apparently considerable freedom of decision and action is affected by such differences.

9. Investigation on Powers Completed. On July 10 the central press announced that the Committee of State Security (KGB) had completed its investigation of the case of Francis G. Powers, shot down in his U-2 aircraft over Sverdlovsk on May 1. The notice stated Powers had been indicted under Article 2 of the Law on Criminal Responsibility for State Crimes (Espionage), that the final indictment had been confirmed by the USSR Prosecutor General and the case turned over to the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court in accordance with Articles 9 and 16 of the Statute on Military Tribunals.

The propaganda buildup for the trial of Francis Powers, U-2 pilot, appears to have been launched by Izvestiya on July 13, which began a series of articles on the U-2 incident.

10. Possible Retirement of Marshal Timoshenko. A brief notice in Soviet Belorussia of July 10 stated that a plenum of the Belorussian Party Central Committee held July 8-9 had released S. K. TIMOSHENKO from his responsibilities as a member of the Bureau of the Central Committee "in connection with his departure from the Party organization of the republic." No indication was given that he had been transferred to another post. Comment: It would seem certain that if Timoshenko has left the Belorussian Party then he is no longer residing in Belorussia. Since he is now in his 65th year, he may have been retired from the army, taking up residence somewhere else in the Soviet Union.

For the Chargé d'Affaires:

Boris H. Klosson

Boris H. Klosson
Counselor for Political Affairs

DECLASSIFIED

Distribution by Embassy: Bonn, Seoul, Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Ankara, Bern, Brussels, Helsinki, Stockholm, London, Kabul, Oslo, Rome, Paris, Sofia, Vienna, Tehran, Tokyo, Copenhagen, Geneva, Istanbul, Munich, Frankfurt, Cairo, Berlin, Hong Kong, USEUCOM, SETAF, USAREUR, CINCNELM (REAR ECHELON), USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSARPAC, USARISC.

DECLASSIFIED